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Uninsured Motorists Insurance or Family Protection Coverage,
is about twelve years old.' It developed as a complement to compul-
sory insurance laws, 2 financial responsibility laws,' Unsatisfied Judg-
ment Fund Acts,' and the New York Motor Vehicle Accident Idemni-
* BA., Bowdoin College, 1955; LL.B., University of Connecticut School of Law,
1962; LL.M., New York University Law School, 1963; Member, Connecticut Bar Associa-
tion; Associate Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research assitance of John P. Jewett, University of Connecticut
School of Law, Class of 1968.
1 For a history of the development of Uninsured Motorists Insurance, see Note,
Uninsured Motorists Insurance: California's Latest Answer To The Problem of The
Financially Irresponsible Motorist, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 516 (1960).
2 Three states, Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina, have compulsory in-
surance laws. Massachusetts requires, before a vehicle can be registered for operation on
public ways or certain private ways, that its owner, and others operating the car with
the owner's consent, be insured against tort liability stemming from its operation, in the
amount of $5,000 for the. personal injury or death of one person and $10,000 for the
personal injury or death of more than one person. Operation of an automobile whose
operators have not been thus insured is a misdemeanor, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90, § IA
(1967) ; ch. 90, §§ 9, 34A-34J (1967) ; ch. 175, §§ 113A-113J (1959). New York provides,
with some exceptions, that no motor vehicle shall be registered unless the application for
registration is accompanied by a certificate of insurance, or a financial security deposit,
or bond, or qualification as a self-insurer. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 310, 311, 314,
315, 319, 320, 321 (1960); §§ 312, 313, 316, 317, 318 (Supp. 1967). Insurance must be for
a minimum of $10,000 for injury to one person, $20,000 for injury to more than one
person, and $5,000 for property damage. North Carolina's minimum liability insurance
is $10,000 for injury' to one person, $20,000 for injury to more than one person, and
$5,000 for damage to property. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-279.1, 20-309 (Supp. 1967).
a Financial responsibility laws require that a driver who becomes involved in an
automobile accident which causes property damage or personal injury above a minimum
amount (e.g., $100) furnish security for the payment of claims arising out of such acci-
dent and also, if the claim has resulted in an adverse judgment, furnish proof of ability to
pay claims arising out of future accidents. Failure to furnish such security or proof leads
to suspension of the driver's license to operate a motor vehicle and, in some states, to
revocation of registration of all motor vehicles owned by the owner of the car involved
in the accident. The proof of security must be for an amount of liability set by statute;
for example, $10,000 for personal injury to any one person, $20,000 for personal injuries
to more than one person, and $5,000 for property damage arising out of one accident.
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-112 (1966); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.5 (1965); N.D.
Cent. Code §§ 39-16-01 (1960); § 39-16.1-08 (Supp. 1967).
4 Unsatisfied Judgment Fund .Acts have been enacted in four states, Maryland,
Michigan, New Jersey and North Dakota. In general, they provide that if a resident of
the state is injured because of the operation of a motor vehicle within the state and his
damages exceed a statutory minimum (usually $100) and the tort-feasor is unknown or
cannot satisfy a judgment against him, a statutory proceeding may be brought against the
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, with recovery limited to a statutory amount, for example,
$10,000 for injury to one person, $20,000 for injury to more than one person, and
$5,000 for property damage. Md. Ann. Code art. 66%, §§ 150-179 (1955), as amended,
§§ 150-177A (Supp. 1967); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 9.2801-9.2831 (Supp. 1968); N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 39:6-61-39:6-91 (1966); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 39-17-01-39-17-10 (Supp. 1967).
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fication Law.' These statutory schemes, while all designed to close the
"solvency gap" between motor vehicle tort judgments and impecu-
nious judgment debtors, still left lacunae in the protection of a state's
citizens. Compulsory insurance laws did not protect against out-of-
state uninsured tort-feasors, financial responsibility laws did not pro-
tect the first victims of uninsured and impecunious tort-feasors, and
unsatisfied judgment funds did not protect a state's citizens against
motor vehicle accidents occurring outside the state.
Uninsured Motorists Insurance does all of these things. Now
being written in all states, it provides that the insured" or his personal
representative will be paid his damages, up to the amount stated in
the policy, for personal injury or death, and sometimes property dam-
age, arising out of an accident for which an uninsured or unidentified
motorist is legally responsible.' Uninsured Motorists Insurance is
usually offered in an amount equal to the amount of security required
for proof of financial responsibility for personal injury under the
financial responsibility law of the state where the insured vehicle is
registered or principally garaged.' At least 30 states require that such
coverage be offered to their policyholders? but most permit the policy-
5 A New York law performs some of the same functions as an Unsatisfied Judgment
Act. N.Y. Ins. Law §§ 600-626 (McKinney 1966). For a discussion of this statute, see
Note, The Problem Of The Financially Irresponsible Motorist—New York's MVAIC, 65
Colum. L. Rev. 1075 (1965).
6 "The insured" is defined by the contract and ordinarily includes the named in-
sured and any relative living in the same household, whether or not they are occupying
an insured automobile, and any other person while occupying an insured automobile.
7 Uninsured Motorists Insurance does not provide that the uninsured motorist's tort
liability is insured by the insurance company of the purchaser of the coverage, but that
the insurance company promises to pay, up to the limits of the coverage, what the un-
insured motorist would be legally liable to pay. Since the insurance company has not
promised to indemnify the uninsured motorist, the insurance company is not precluded
from asserting a claim against the uninsured motorist for its damages arising out of the
uninsured motorist's wrong.
Typically, $10,000 for the injury or death of one person, and $20,000 for the injury
or death of more than one person. Where Uninsured Motorists Coverage includes damages
for harm to property, as is required in some states, the amount of such property damage
coverage ranges between $1,000 and $5,000.
9 Ala. Code tit. 36, § 74(42)-74(83) (1959) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-259.01
(Supp. 1967) ; Ark. Stat. Ann. § 66-4003 (1966) ; Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2 (West Supp.
1967) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72-12-19 (1965) ; Conn. Pub. Acts, 1967, No. 510 § 4; Fla.
Stat. § 627.0851 (Supp. 1968) ; Ga. Code Ann. § 56-407.1 (Supp. 1967) ; Rev. Laws of
Hawaii ch. 181, § 447 (Supp. 1965) ; III. Rev. Stat. ch. 73, § 755a (1965) ; Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 39-4310 (Burns 1965) ; Iowa Code Ann. § 516A.1 (Supp. 1968) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.682
(Baldwin Supp. 1967) ; La. Rev. Stat. art. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1967) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 24, § 502 (Supp. 1967) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 24.13010 (Supp. 1968) ; Miss Code Ann.
§§ 8285-51-8285-57 (Supp. 1966) ; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 40-4403 (Supp. 1967) ; Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 60-509.01 (Supp. 1967) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268:15-a (Supp. 1967) ; N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 64-24-105 (Supp. 1967) ; N.Y. Ins. Law § 167 (2-a) (McKinney 1966) ; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b) (3) (Supp. 1967) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3937.19 (Supp. 1966) ;
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 736.317 (1965) ; Pa, Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 2000 (Supp. 1967) ; R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 27-7-2.1 (Supp. 1966) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1967) ; Va. Code
Ann. § 38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1968) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 204.30(5) (Supp. 1968).
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holder to reject such coverage The premium is quite low, typically
under $10 per year for insurance covering the driver and passengers
in a single passenger car.
When the insurance company pays an insured's claim under the
coverage, the payment does not extinguish the insured's claim against
the insured motorist. The insured's total claim may be greater than the
maximum amount of the insurance company's liability, or the damages
as compromised between the company and the insured may be less
than the potential common-law liability of the insured motorist to the
insured. Moreover, even if the insured feels that he has been fully com-
pensated for his damages, the insurance company may wish to recoup
its losses by pursuing, as subrogee,'° the uninsured motorist. Some-
times both the insurance company and the insured will assert a claim
against the uninsured motorist, the insurance company to recover by
virtue of contracted-for subrogation'' what it has paid the insured, and
the insured to recover his damages above what he has been paid by the
insurance company. The problems raised by the insurance company's
attempt to assert subrogation rights against the uninsured motorist,
devices presently used to resolve these problems, and suggestions for
other ways to resolve such problems are the subjects of this article.
I. PROBLEMS RAISED BY SUBROGATION TO CLAIMS AGAINST
UNINSURED MOTORISTS
A. The Social Desirability of Subrogation
Lawsuits are expensive enterprises. They exact an economic toll
of investigation expenses, attorneys' fees, loss of worktime by parties
10 In the classic sense, subrogation occurs "where property of one person is used in
discharging an obligation owed by another or a lien upon the property of another, under
such circumstances that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the
benefit thus conferred. ..." Restatement of Restitution, § 162 (1937). The obligation is
thus revived in equity for the benefit of him whose property was used to discharge it. In
the Uninsured Motorists Insurance situation the insurance company's payment is not used
to discharge the tort-feasor's liability. Under the collateral source rule compensation from
someone who has committed no breach of duty does not reduce the amount of the vic-
tim's claim against the tort-feasor. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1958);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 28 Cal. 2d 347, 349, 170 P.2d 448, 450 (1946); Hard-
ing v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 199, 200-201 (1871) ; see Note, Unreason In The Law
Of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1964). But the term
subrogation is well established in the insurance context as referring to the equitable right
of the insurance company to assert the rights of the insured against the tort-feasor.
1' We are here speaking of contractual, or conventional subrogation, provided for
in the insurance contract. In the ordinary automobile property damage, theft or fire
insurance policy, subrogation rights would be recognized in equity even in the absence
of a contract providing for them. Universal Credit Co. ex rel. Lewallen v. Service Fire
Ins. Co., 69 Ga. App. 357, 25 S.E.2d 526 (1943); King, Subrogation Under Contracts
Insuring Property, 30 Texas L. Rev. 62 (1951); 16 G. Couch, Insurance § 61:238 (2d ed.
1966). But for reasons to be discussed in this article, the insurance companies are unwilling
to rely on "equitable" or "legal" subrogation, that is subrogation in the absence of a policy
provision providing for it, when subrogation rights under an Uninsured Motorists En-
dorsement are involved.
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and witnesses, and expense to the community for judicial facilities and
personnel, and an emotional toll of stress wrought upon litigants and
witnesses. It would seem, then, that an attempt by an insurance com-
pany, which has paid a loss under its policy, to redistribute the loss
through subrogation, should be rewarded only if such redistribution
will produce advantages worth the economic and social cost.
One reason for the allowing of subrogation to underwriters of
Uninsured Motorists Insurance lies in the stimulus such subrogation
rights might give for the purchase of liability insurance. If a financially
irresponsible person were operating a motor vehicle in a state where
Uninsured Motorists Insurance was widespread, but subrogation was
not allowed to the writers of such coverage, he might be led to pur-
chase no bodily-injury insurance at all, on the assumption that any
damage he does will be paid for by the victim's insurance company,
and that the victim, who may have been fully compensated, will not
pursue him, and the insurance company will have no right to do so.
Another reason for allowing subrogation would be that the insured,
in the absence of subrogation, would be allowed, under the collateral
source rule, to recover from the uninsured motorist, even if the insur-
ance company had paid all the insured's damages. If society's resources
are to be invested in a lawsuit by a victim who has been paid by his
insurance company, the benefits ought to redound to the parties who
have suffered uncompensated loss, including the insurance companies."
12 Statistics on recoveries by insurance companies through the pursuit of claims
against uninsured motorists have been difficult to collect. Insurance companies apparently
keep statistics only on the basis of the amount of money paid out under Uninsured
Motorists Coverage during a calendar period and the amount of money recovered by
the companies from uninsured motorists during the same period. There is available
no breakdown as to how much money is recovered before suit against the uninsured
motorist, after suit and before judgment, and after judgment. Nor could there be obtained
any statistics as to how much was recovered by insureds from uninsured motorists, above
what was recovered by insurance companies. What figures are available indicate that
insurance companies recover from uninsured motorists a minute percentage of what they
pay out to the insureds under Uninsured Motorists Insurance. For example, from January
1, 1967, through June 30, 1967, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company paid out $2,037,561
and recovered $87,710. Letter from Blaney C. Turner, Vice President Claim Department,
Aetna Life and Casualty Company, August 22, 1967. The statistical experiences of the
New York Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Corporation (MVAIC) is similar. During
the period from January 1, 1959, through December 31, 1966, MVAIC paid out $30,059,-
902, and recovered $569,188. Letter from Frank Karwayne, Chief Actuary, New York
Insurance Department, August 23, 1967. (This recovery, less than 2 percent of the
amount paid out, is substantially less than the 331/3 percent recovery, which the New
York Department of Motor Vehicles in 1955 estimated could be had from legally liable
Uninsured Motorists. George, Insuring Injuries Caused By Uninsured Motorists, 1956
Ins. Law J. 715, 718.) Statistics developed from a study of automobile accidents which
occurred in Southeastern Pennsylvania in 1956, however, indicated that 11 percent of those
injured in automobile accidents by legally responsible uninsured motorists were able to
recover from the uninsured motorists at least 150 percent of their "tangible losses" (loss
of earnings, medical expenses, burial expenses), after deducting attorney's fees. Morris &




Some of the recoveries by insurance companies might eventually flow
through to insurance buyers in the form of reduced premiums for Un-
insured Motorists Insurance.'
B. Subrogation And The Rule Against Assignments Of Causes Of
Action For Bodily Injury
When an Uninsured Motorists Insurance carrier has paid, under
that coverage, a claim for bodily injury, difficulties can arise when the
company asserts, against the uninsured motorist, that it is subrogated
by virtue of the insurance contract to the insured's claim for bodily
injury. Conventional, or contractual, subrogation to a cause of action
has been equated with assignment of the cause of action." At common
law a cause of action for personal injury was not assignable'' because
the courts feared champerty,'° (the buying of a claim from one who
might not be disposed to prosecute it himself in the hope of making a
speculative profit), and because the damage was too personal to be
asserted by an assignee. 17
Since the enactment, within the last century, of statutes pro-
viding for the survivability of causes of action for personal injury,
courts in about half the states have held that assignability and sur-
vivability are convertible terms and that since causes of action for
personal injury can pass to personal representatives, they can be
transferred inter vivos to an assignee." If such causes can be trans-
13 R. Horn, Subrogation In Insurance Theory and Practice 25 (1964). But see E.
Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 51 (2d ed. 1957).
14 The subrogation agreements . . . constituted in substance and effect a partial
assignment.. . ." General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 364, 52 N.E.2d
970, 973 (1944). A California case said: "[Titre result is to transfer the insured's cause of
action against a third-party tort-feasor to the insurer." Feller v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (1963). See also Fifield Manor v.
Funston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 640, 354 P.2d 1073, 1078, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 382 (1960) ; City of
Richmond v. Hanes, 203 Va. 102, 109, 122 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1960).
15 North Chicago St. Ry. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 49 N.C. 222 (1897) ; Rice v. Stone,
83 Mass. (1 Allen) 566, 569-70 (1861) ; Restatement of Contracts § 547 (1932) ; Annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955),
16 See Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 566, 569 (1861). For the history of the
assignability of causes of action, see 8 W. Holdsworth, History Of English Law 115 (2d
ed. 1937); Bailey, The Assignment Of Debts In England From The Twelfth To The
Twentieth Century, 48 L.Q. Rev. 248 (1932) ; Cook, The Alienability Of Choses In Action,
29 Harv. L. Rev. 816 (1916).
17 "A claim to damages for a personal tort, before it is established by agreement or
adjudication, has no value that can be so estimated as to form a proper consideration for
a sale. Until it is thus established, it has no elements of property sufficient to make it the
subject of a grant or an assignment. The considerations which are urged to a jury in
behalf of one whose reputation or domestic peace has been destroyed, whose feelings have
been outraged, or who has suffered bodily pain and danger, are of a nature so strictly
personal, that an assignee cannot urge them with any force." Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass.
(1 Allen) 566, 570 (1861).
E.g., Grand Rapids & Ind. Ry. v. Cheboygan Circuit Judge, 161 Mich. 180, 191,
126 N.W. 56, 60 (1910); see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955).
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ferred, it should be possible to transfer them to a subrogee. 19 There
should be no fear of champerty. The purpose of the rule against
champerty "is to prevent strife and litigation, and this it aims to secure
by forbidding parties not interested to contract for an interest in the
thing to be recovered, upon condition of their carrying on the suit.” 2°
The subrogated insurance company is not a speculator buying up an-
other's claims. The insurer has paid pursuant to an endorsement
which, in many states, it has been required to offer to purchasers of
automobile liability insurance." The insurance company has acquired
an interest in the cause of action only after paying a claim that it had
a contractual duty to pay, and the promise to make such payment was
made before the cause of action arose. (There is no chance of specu-
lative profit to the insurance company, since it will be allowed to keep
against the insured no more than the amount it has paid him, plus
expenses.)"
It is true that in about one-half the states causes of action for
personal injury remain unassignable, either because the concomitance
between survivability and assignability is rejected," or because a sta-
tute expressly says that causes of action for personal injury are not
assignable," or because the survival statute does not include causes of
action for damage to the person' or because there is no survival
statute."
Even in such non-assignability states, it seems that subrogation
ought to be allowed to Uninsured Motorists Insurance carriers and
ought not to be equated with assignment. If the reasons for not per-
mitting assignments of causes of action for bodily injury are fear of
10 See D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prods. Co,, 19 Wis. 2d 390, 397, 120 N.W.2d
70 (1963).
20 Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 142, 144 (1861); see City of N.Y. Ins. Co. v. Tice,
159 Kan. 176, 180, 152 P.2d 836, 839 (1944).
21 See statutes cited in note 9 supra.
22 See the policy provisions quoted in note 56 infra, and trust agreement provisions
quoted in note 58 infra.
23 See Klar v. Dade County, 116 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Beechwood
v. Joplin-Pittsburg Ry., 173 Mo. App. 371, 158 S.W. 868 (1913). In some states survival
statutes or real party in interest statutes expressly say that survivability will not make
assignable causes of action that arc nut otherwise assignable. E.g., Cal. Prob. Code § 573
(West Supp. 1967); sec Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34
Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963); Va. Code § 8-628.1 (Supp. 1968) ; W. Va. Code § 55-7-8a(f)
(1966). In California and Virginia, however, the legislatures have expressly provided for
subrogation rights for Uninsured Motorists Insurance carriers. Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(f)
(West Supp. 1967) ; Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(f) (Supp. 1968).
24 See N.Y. Gen. Obligations Law § 13-101 (McKinney 1964).
25 See III. Rev. Stat. ch. 3, § 339 (1965). In Washington the survival statute expressly
excludes damages for pain and suffering. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.20.046 (1962). All other
elements of damage growing out of a tort to the person can be recovered by assignees
and personal representatives. Harvey v. Cleman, 65 Wash. 2d 853, 858, 400 P.2d 87,
90 (1965).
20 See Employers Cas. Co. v. Moore, 60 Ariz. 544, 142 P.2d 414 (1943).
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the buying of causes of action in order to prosecute them in hope of
profit, and doubt that anyone but the injured party can properly urge
his damages upon the court," these dangers do not seem present in
Uninsured Motorists Insurance subrogation situations. The insurance
company is not "trafficking" in causes of action; it is seeking to re-
cover a sum that it was contractually constrained to pay. It is not
seeking any speculative increment but merely reimbursement. The
objection that the injured person's damages cannot be urged by any-
one other than the victim is not very persuasive, especially if the vic-
tim is a plaintiff, as he often will be,' or if he will be there to testify
to his injuries.
C. The Restriction of Insurance Subrogation To Contracts Of
Indemnity
Legal or equitable insurance subrogation, that is subrogation that
is not provided for in the insurance policy, has been traditionally
restricted to insurers who pay claims under contracts of indemnity."
The term "contracts of indemnity" includes fire, theft, marine, and
automobile property damage policies, but has been said not to include
life insurance policies"' or accident insurance policies which pay a
specified sum per injury." It is not altogether clear why life and acci-
dent insurance coverages are not deemed to be policies of indemnity.
The reason may be that they involve a promise to pay a sum certain
rather than to make the insured whole for his loss." Under life and
accident insurance there is no necessary relation between the amount
of the insured's loss and the amount payable under the policy." Also,
there are intimations that an insurance policy is not an indemnity
policy if it insures against loss which is not pecuniary, out-of-pocket
loss." The restriction of the meaning of the term "indemnity insur-
ance" to insurance which compensates for out-of-pocket loss and the
restriction of insurance subrogation to such indemnity contracts may
reflect the policy against assignment of causes of action where damages
are uncertain and a speculative profit is possible. Whatever the reasons
27 See text at notes 15-17 supra.
28 See text at note 54 infra.
29 W. Vance, Insurance § 134 at 797 (3d ed. 1951). Kimball & Davis, The Extension
of Insurance Subrogation, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 841, 849 (1962).
39 W. Vance, supra note 29, at 797.
31 Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633
(1908). Kimball & Davis, supra note 29, at 845-46.
32 Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 72 S.W. 621 (1902),
modified 96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903).
33 See Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co , 136 Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633
(1908).
34 Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 115 F.2d 277, 281
(4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941) ; Kimball & Davis, supra note 29, at 856.
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for confining insurance subrogation to contracts of indemnity, the ques-
tion whether the Uninsured Motorists Insurance Endorsement is an
indemnity coverage subject to subrogation will be asked. The answer
to this question should not make any difference in a state where a
claim for personal injury is assignable, because if such a claim is as-
signable, it ought to be susceptible of contractual subrogation, even
if contractual subrogation is deemed to be assigned pursuant to an in-
surance policy provision. Even in states in which claims for personal
injury are not assignable, subrogation for Uninsured Motorists Insur-
ance carriers should not fail on the grounds that the contract is not
one of indemnity. The insured can recover from the company under
Uninsured Motorists Coverage only to the extent that he can prove
loss or damage (although damage can include pain and suffering),
and this is one of the identifying marks of a contract of indemnity.'
The objection that the other indication of a contract of indemnity, the
restriction of payments to the amount necessary to make good pecu-
niary loss, is not present, should be met by noting that there is no chance
of speculative profit to the insurance company. Non-economic harm
is recognized as compensable by our legal system and there is no reason
why insurance for it should not be subject to subrogation in the same
way that insurance for economic loss is subject to subrogation when
there is no danger of speculation. After all, the person primarily liable,
the tort-feasor, is going to be liable for all proved damages, pecuniary
or non-pecuniary, and his payment of such damages should redound
to the benefit of the person who has already paid such damages, the
would-be subrogee. Besides, the insurer and insured have contracted
for subrogation and there is no convincing reason not to permit it
whether or not the contract under which the insurer paid the insured
is technically a contract of "indemnity"."
D. Subrogation And The Rule Against Splitting A Cause Of Action
There is a common-law rule that subrogation rights will not arise
until the subrogor's entire loss has been paid." The reason for this rule
purportedly is that the creditor should not be required to share con-
35 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Parker, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 521, 72 S.W. 621 (1902), modified
96 Tex. 287, 72 S.W. 168 (1903); Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136
Wis. 34, 116 N.W. 633 (1908).
3° Hospital Serv. Corp. of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., — R.I. —, 227 A.2d 105,
110-111 (1967); Kimball & Davis, supra note 29, at 986.
37 Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 104 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.
1939) ; U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 186 Kan. 637, 352 P.2d
70 (1960) ; Northwestern F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Fred T. Ley & Co., 238 App. Div. 255,
264 N.Y.S. 517 (1933); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 855 (1934) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R. 1596 (1920);
but see Universal Credit Co. ex rd. Lewallen v. Service Fire Ins. Co., 69 Ga. App. 357,
25 S.E.2d 526 (1943); Patituccu v. Gerhardt, 206 Wis. 358, 240 N.W. 385 (1932).
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trol of his security and of his debt until he has been fully reimbursed."
The insured under Uninsured Motorists Insurance, who has a claim
against the tort-feasor, may not have been fully reimbursed by the in-
surance company. He may claim his damages exceed the coverage un-
der Uninsured Motorists Insurance, and wish to retain an interest in
the claim against the tort-feasor. In addition he may have security for
that claim by way of the bond given by the tort-feasor under the state's
financial responsibility law 3 9 But it has been said that if the insured
has agreed to subrogation the debtor cannot object that the creditor
is sharing his debt or his security."
The debtor may be able to object that the splitting of the cause of
action subjects him to double harassment. In the property insurance
context, where the policy contains a deductible provision, the insured
will frequently give the insurer a "subrogation receipt," which can be
construed not only as a subrogation agreement, but also as an assign-
ment of the entire cause of action for property damage, with the in-
surer agreeing to retain out of any recovery, only what the insurer has
paid the insured, plus a pro rata part of the costs of recovery from the
tort-feasor." In the property damage insurance cases then, no prob-
lem arises as to the splitting of a cause of action. But where a partial
subrogation situation exists, and no assignment of the cause of action
has taken place, cannot the debtor successfully claim that he is now
being harassed by two creditors instead of one, that the insured's
cause of action is being split? Is not the rule against the splitting of a
cause of action meant to protect the defendant from harrassment by
multiple claims for a single breach of duty?' Does not the tort-feasor
now have to come to terms with two creditors instead of one? If partial
subrogation is permitted and the tort-feasor settles with the insured
knowing of the insurer's claim, he will be still liable to the insurer.'
Still, courts will sometimes allow a cause of action to be split, and
the defendant to be subjected to dual claims, when such a split is con-
sidered justified. For example, when a single act in breach of duty
38 Mid-States Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 234 F.2d 721, 731 (9th Cir.
1956).
38 See note 3 supra.
40 Mid-States Ins. Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 234 F.2d 721, 731 (9th Cir.
1956) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cleveland, Cinc., C. & St. L. Ry., 74 Ind. App. 272, 124
N.E. 774 (1919); King, supra note 11.
41 See Home Ins. Co. v. Smith, 235 Mo. App. 552, 140 S.W.2d 64 (1940). A cause
of action for property damages is freely assignable. Sperry v. Stennick, 68 Ore. 96, 101,
129 P. 130, 132 (1913). North v. Turner, 9 S. & R. 244, 249 (Pa. 1823); Annot., 57
A.L.R.2d 603 (1958).
42 See Wheeler Say. Bank v. Tracey, 141 Mo. 252, 258, 42 S.W. 946, 947 (1897).
43 See Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N.Y. 162, 158 N.E. 60 (1927); Motorists
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gerson, 113 Ohio App. 321, 17 Ohio Op. 2d 333, 177 N.E.2d 790 (1960);
16 G. Couch, Insurance § 61:197 (2d ed. 1966). But see Inter ins. Exch. of Chicago Motor
Club v. Andersen, 331 ill. App. 250, 73 N.E.2d 12 (1947).
85
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
affects both the person and property of another, most jurisdictions say
that only one cause of action arises because there has been only one
breach of duty." Among these states, however, some will allow the
insurance company to prosecute separately the property damage
claim as subrogee, because the rule against splitting is not directed
against one who acquires an interest in a cause of action by virtue of a
contractual duty to reimburse the victim of another's breach of duty.'
Also, where an insurance company has acquired part of a cause of
action by subrogation and the insured, the owner of the balance of the
cause of action, is unwilling to join in the suit because he cannot be
reached by process, the insurance company may sue for its damage in-
dependently of the claim of the insured."
In the Uninsured Motorists Insurance subrogation situation, a
court might be unwilling to allow the insured and insurer ordinarily to
harass the tort-feasor in separate actions, but why should they not
be allowed to sue together but settle separately?' If the insurer set-
tled, the jury in the insured's action could be instructed to reduce the
damages awarded by the amount of money paid to the insured by the
insurer. Such instructions would be similar to those now given when a
plaintiff who sues one joint tort-feasor has been paid money by the
other joint tort-feasor in return for a covenant not to sue. And if the
insured settled, and only the insurer's subrogation claim remained to
be prosecuted, the court could order the amount claimed in the ad
damnum clause to be reduced to the amount paid by the insurance
company.
E. The Insurance Company's Desire To Keep Its Identity'
Undisclosed To The Jury
The subrogated insurance company will wish to pursue its claim
against the tort-feasor in an action in which the insured is named as
the only plaintiff, so that the insurer can keep its interest undisclosed
to the jury. This objective can be difficult to attain in a state which
44 See Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 273 Pa. 282, 117 A. 59 (1922) ;
Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 977 (1958).
45 E.g., General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 357 Mo. 1099, 1107, 212 S.W.2d 396,
400 (1948). See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 977 (1958).
In addition, cases which consider an occurrence resulting in damage to both person
and property as giving rise to separate causes of action sometimes expressly state that
they reach such a result at least partially for the reason that treatment of the claim as a
single cause of action would inhibit transfer of the cause of action for property damage
to the insurance company. Clancey v. McBride, 338 Ill. 35, 169 N.E. 729 (1929) ; Reilly
v. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co., 170 N.Y. 40, 62 N.E. 772 (1902).
40 United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 382 (1949) ; see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 19(b) ; Louisville & N. Ry. v. Mack Mfg. Co., 269 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Ky. 1954).
47 Under the Workmen's Compensation Acts in some states, the injured employee
and his employer's insurance company cannot sue separately, but may settle separately,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2363(b) (Supp. 1966) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17,189 (1960).
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has a real party in interest rule. About three-quarters of the states
have statutes or rules of court which provide that actions shall, or
may, be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." A few
are permissive, merely authorizing the real party in interest to sue,"
but most such statutes or rules are mandatory. They state that an
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
The majority of the mandatory statutes or rules have been construed
to require that when the insurance company has paid the entire loss
and is totally subrogated to the rights of the insured, the action against
the tort-feasor must be prosecuted in the name of the insurance com-
pany, since the insured is no longer a party in interest." The insured
may be able to sue "for the use and benefit of the insurer" but, the
insurance company will apparently be identified." And in the partial
subrogation situation, when the insured sues for the entire amount of
the loss, the defendant can, in some states having mandatory real
party in interest rules, compel joinder of the insurance company as a
party." Some jurisdictions having mandatory real party in, interest
48 For a full discussion of real party in interest statutes and rules, see Atkinson, The
Real Party In Interest Rule: A Plea For Its Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 926 (1957).
49 See, e.g., Conn. Prac. Book, § 66 (1963); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210 (1967).
53 Many mandatory real party in interest rules are modeled after Rule 17(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which reads: "Every action shall be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee
of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name without
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought ...." E.g., S.D. Code
§ 33.0402 (Supp. 1960). Utah Code Ann. R. Civ. P. 17 (a) (1953) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
I§ 4.08.010, 4.08.020 (1962).
51 Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 229 (1967). The totally subrogated insurance company prose-
cutes both the legal claim of the subrogor and its own equitable claim, since law and
equity jurisdiction are now merged. Before the merger of law and equity, the subrogor
could sue in equity in his own name, but at law would sue in the name of the subrogor
for the use and benefit of the subrogee. Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest,
34 Yale L.J. 259, 262-63, 271 (1925).
52 City of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 159 Ran. 176, 186, 152 P.2d 836, 842-43 (1944).
53 "The pleadings should be made to reveal and assert the actual interest of the
plaintiff, and to indicate the interests of any others in the claim." United States v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 382 (1949) ; see Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D.
267, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1955). In Missouri, which has a mandatory real party in interest
statute, the insured can apparently sue in his own name without identifying the totally
subrogated insurer in the pleadings. Hayes v. Jenkins, 337 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Mo. Ct. App.
1960).
54 See Salzwedel v. Pinkley, 140 Ore. 671, 15 P.2d 718 (1932) ; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
140 (1967). Under a 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it may be
that the insurance company need not be ordered joined as a party unless there is a danger
that the defendant will incur "double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations ...."
Fed. It. Civ. P. 19(a). It can be argued, however, that since the subrogated insurance
company's interest is not distinct and severable, it is an indispensable party and must be
joined. Cf. Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 429 (9th Cir. 1936). The "indis-
pensable party" doctrine may be a rule of substantive law and therefore not be affected
by Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Provident Tradesmens' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966).
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rules do allow, either by legislation or court decision, an insurance
company totally to hide its identity behind the insured, and not to
disclose its interest to the trier of fact." But, in many jurisdictions,
mandatory real party in interest rules pose a real threat to the desire
of the subrogated insurance company for anonymity.
II. THE USE OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT TO AVOID THE
PROBLEMS OF SUBROGATION
In order to avoid the problems raised by an attempt to contract
for the right to be subrogated to the insured's cause of action, or part
of it, against the tort-feasor, the insurance companies have inserted in
the insurance contract a provision that, if any person receives pay-
ment under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, such person will
hold his cause of action in trust for the insurer to the extent of the in-
surer's payment to him, and shall, if requested by the insurer, take
appropriate action to recover in his own name, such payment, as dam-
ages froth the person legally responsible therefor."
The injured person, the Uninsured Motorists Insurance claim-
ant, is bound by this contract provision, unless it is against public
policy. He is bound either because as a purchaser of insurance he is
a party to the contract, or because he claims as an "insured" under
55 E.g., Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, R. Civ. P. 2002(d) (1951); Catalfano v. Higgins, 188
A.2d 357 (Del. 1962); Alaska Pac. S.S. Co. v. Sperry Flour Co., 94 Wash. 227, 162 P.
26 (1917).
56 The policy form provided by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters reads
as follows:
Trust Agreement. In the event of payment to any person under this endorsement:
(a) the company shall be entitled to the extent of such payment to the proceeds
of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights
of recovery of such person against any person or organization legally re-
sponsible for the bodily injury because of which such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of
recovery which he shall have against such other person or organization be-
cause of the damages which are the subject of claim made under this endorse-
ment;
(c) such person shall do whatever is proper to secure and shall do nothing after
loss to prejudice such rights;
(d) if requested in writing by the company, such person shall take, through any
representative designated by the company, such action as may be necessary
or appropriate to recover such payment as damages from such other person
or organization, such action to be taken in the name of such person; in the
event of a recovery, the company shall be reimbursed out of such recovery
for expenses, costs and attorneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith;
(e) such person shall execute and deliver to the company such instruments and
papers as may be appropriate to secure the rights and obligations of such
person and the company established by this provision. (Form A 668A, Janu-
ary 1, 1963.)
The right held in trust is the right of recovery not only against an uninsured motorist,
but against an insured motorist who might be jointly liable with the uninsured motorist
for the claimant's injuries.
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the policy and thus would be deemed, as a third-party beneficiary of
the contract, to have accepted its terms."' In addition, before an in-
surance company pays the claimant any moneys under the Uninsured
Motorists Endorsement, it customarily requires him to execute a trust
agreement, in which he expressly undertakes to hold his cause of
action in trust." But it is doubtful that the use of the trust agreement
will serve as a cure for all of the insurance companies' subrogation
problems under Uninsured Motorists Insurance.
With respect to the splitting of the cause of action and double
harassment of the defendant, the need that the defendant bargain with,
and settle with, both the insured and the insurer will be eliminated.
Since the insured is the trustee of the cause of action, the insured
will be in full control of any settlement and a release from the trustee
to the uninsured motorist, if purchased for a price not so patently
low as to make the granting of the release an obvious breach of trust,
will bind the insurer-beneficiary, even though the uninsured motorist
knows of the trust.'"
57 See S. Williston, Contracts § 364A (3d ed. 1959).
58 A typical trust agreement provides:
The undersigned does hereby release, acquit and forever discharge 	
	  Insurance Company from all claims, known or unknown, that the
undersigned may ever have against it under the uninsured motorists coverage of
its policy No.—, arising out of the accident mentioned below and agrees to
hold in trust for the benefit of the company all rights of recovery the undersigned
shall have against anyone who may be legally liable for the damages for bodily
injuries sustained by the undersigned caused by the automobile accident that
occurred on  , at or near  , and agrees that the
company shall be entitled, to the extent of its payment hereunder, to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any
such rights, and agrees to do whatever is proper to secure such rights and to do
nothing to prejudice such rights, and to take, through any representative desig-
nated by the company, such action as may be necessary or appropriate to recover
the damages suffered by the undersigned in said action, and that such action may
be taken in the name of the undersigned and that, in the event of a recovery the
company shall he reimbursed out of such recovery for expenses, costs and at-
torneys' fees incurred by it in connection therewith, and to execute and to deliver
to the company such instruments and papers as may he appropriate to secure the
rights and obligations of the insured and the company established by the pro-
visions of the above endorsement.
55 The policy and trust agreement require the trustee to "take action [against the
person legally responsible] through a representative designated by the company." The
decision to settle and the signing of a release is not action which is ordinarily done through
a representative. The word "action" should be taken to refer only to legal action, to plead-
ing before the courts, which is ordinarily done through a representative. Even if the
quoted language is ambiguous on this point, any ambiguity in an instrument should be
construed against the drafter of the instrument, the insurance company. Remsen v. Mid-
way Liquors, Inc., 30 III. App. 2d 132, 149, 174 N.E.2d 7, 15 (1961); In re Travelers
Indem. Co., 26 Misc. 2d 513, 514, 205 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Since the
insured would have the right against the insurer to settle with the tort-feasor for a fair
figure, a release from the insured to the tort-feasor, in return for payment in a fair amount,
would bind the insurer, the beneficiary of the trust, in his relations with the tort-fcasor.
The insurer, the beneficiary of the trust, having entered into the trust agreement, could
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The trust agreement should also foreclose the putative tort-
feasor from raising the objection that the Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsement is not a contract of indemnity and is not therefore the sub-
ject of subrogation. If the insured and the insurer take the position
that the insurer has no direct relationship with the tort-feasor, but is
only the beneficiary of a trust of the insured's cause of action against
the tort-feasor and cannot directly prosecute the action against the
tort-feasor or even control its prosecution, it would not seem that the
tort-feasor could raise any question about the indemnity nature of the
insurance contract. It would seem to be of no concern to the defendant
what the insured does with the proceeds of any settlement with, or
judgment against, the defendant. If, on the other hand, the insurer
sought to be represented by a separate attorney and sought the right
to cross-examine witnesses, or to challenge prospective jurors, and the
insured concurred in the insurer's position" then the insured should
be treated as a subrogee and questions of the indemnity nature of the
insurance contract would be raised. But, as we have seen, the Unin-
sured Motorists Endorsement ought to be treated as a contract of in-
demnity and properly the subject of subrogation anyway."
In the absence of a trust agreement an insurance company might
have difficulty in asserting subrogation rights to a cause of action for
personal injury." And where a cause of action for personal injury can-
not be assigned" and subrogation to a cause of action for personal in-
jury is equated with the assignment of a cause of action for personal
injury," it could be argued that a declaration of trust of a cause of
action would not give the insurance company a beneficial interest in
the cause of action, on the theory that what cannot be transferred
directly cannot be transferred indirectly by means of a trust. "A per-
son who has a cause of action for tort which cannot be transferred
cannot create a trust of the cause of action."" But this view seems to
oversimplify matters. Causes of action for personal injury cannot be
transferred because of the fear of speculative profit and because one
person cannot assert another's personal injury." Even without the
trust agreement, the fear of speculative profit is removed by the fact
that the insurance company is given by the contract and trust agree-
ment an interest in the claim only to the extent of its payments to the
not claim that it was a subrogee, and that it was therefore entitled to enter into its own
settlement agreement.
60 See text at notes 93-97 infra.
62 See text at notes 35 and 36 supra.
62 See text at notes 14-27 supra.
63 See text at notes 23-26 supra.
64 See text at note 14 supra.
65 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 79, comment d (1959). See O'Brien v.
Catholic Order of Foresters, 220 Mass. 79, 107 N.E. 400 (1915).
68 See text at notes 16 and 17 supra.
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insured plus expenses.67 The argument that only the injured party
can assert his own injuries is an artificial one, but even if it has any
viability, it ought to be overcome by the use of the trust agreement,
under which the insured, as trustee will assert his own injuries, in be-
half of the insurer as well as himself, even though he may be using an
attorney selected by the company. Of course, if the insured and the
insurer retain separate attorneys" and they plead separately, or both
try the case, then it can be argued that someone other than the insured
is asserting his injuries.
Where a mandatory real party in interest rule requires that a
totally subrogated insurance company be named as a party to the
action or identified in the pleadings, or allows the defendant to com-
pel joinder of a partially subrogated insurance company in a suit
by the insured,°° it can be argued that the fact that the insurance
company has become a beneficiary of a trust, rather than a mere
subrogee, should not make any difference. It is true that the manda-
tory real party in interest rules usually contain a provision which
reads, typically, "an executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee
of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by
statute may sue in his own name."" But it has been held in the federal
courts that the rules of evidence allow the defendant to bring before
the jury the identity of the beneficiaries of the trust of which the plain-
tiff is trustee.' In any event, it is doubtful whether the insured should
be considered as a trustee for the purpose of the provision in favor
of trustees. A trust usually exists for some purpose other than the
desire to avoid prohibitions against the assignment of causes of action.
The provision in favor of trustees may have been inserted to make it
clear that passive beneficiaries of conventional trusts need not be
joined with the trustee as plaintiff, as some older cases had required."
It was probably not intended to provide a cloak of anonymity for an
insurance company which is seeking reimbursement for an amount it
has paid out under an insurance policy, especially an insurance com-
pany which has reserved to itself the right to choose the attorney
who will represent the trustee, who represents the insurance company."
67 See text at note 22 supra.
68 See text at note 96 infra.
60 See text at notes 51-54 supra.
70 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) ; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Code Civ. P.
§ 369 (West 1954) ; Ohio Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2307.08 (1954).
71 Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D. 267, 270 (W.D. Mo. 1955). See Ken-
nedy, Federal Rule 17(a): Will The Real Party In Interest Please Stand? 51 Minn. L. Rev.
675, 690 (1967).
72 See Atkinson, supra note 48, at 952; Dunn v. Seymour, 11 N.J. Eq. 220 (Ch. 1856).
73 See policy and trust agreement provisions quoted in notes 56 & 58 supra. Another
device for avoiding the real party in interest rules, the "loan receipt," has been struck
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Perhaps there is good reason to keep the identity of the insurance
company from the trier, in order to prevent the trier from inclining
toward the uninsured motorist on the issues of liability and damage.
Identification of the insurance company could be prejudicial, not only
to it, but to the insured-trustee, since a judgment for the uninsured
motorist, or a low damage award, would cut down or eliminate the
insured's recovery, for his own account, from the uninsured motorist.
But if such an approach is to be adopted, it ought to be done so ex-
pressly by court or legislature," and confrontation on this issue should
not be avoided by a too-ready assumption that the insured is a
"trustee" as that word is used in real party in interest statutes.
III. OTHER PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE TRUST AGREEMENT
Apart from the question whether the trust agreement is effective
to overcome the problem for which it was designed, the typical trust
agreement contains some provisions which ought to be objectionable
from a public policy standpoint, that is, from the point of view of
persons or institutions who are expected to protect the public and
represent its interests, such as insurance commissioners, legislators
and the courts themselves.
A. The Trustee's Duty With Respect to Settlement With a
Third Party
The policy and trust agreement customarily contain, with respect
to the insured's privilege to settle with the uninsured motorist, lan-
guage to the effect that the trustee "shall do whatever is proper to
secure and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice" his rights of
down by some courts as a subterfuge without substance. When insurance companies have
paid out property damage claims to insureds, by virtue of property damage provisions in
automobile or fire or marine insurance policies, and wish to pursue the wrongdoer under
subrogation rights, the companies have frequently attempted to skirt real party in interest
rules by providing in the policy that they will "lend" the insured the amount of his dam-
age, the insured promising to repay the company out of any recovery from the tort-
feasor. The insurance company then argues that it is not a real party in interest, since it
is only a creditor of the insured, and not the equitable owner of any part of the cause of
action. This device has failed in those states which view the insurance company's payment
as a reimbursement of an insured loss rather than a loan and therefore view the insurance
company as having acquired an equitable interest in the cause of action and as being a
real party in interest. Cleveland Paint & Color Co. v. Bauer Mfg. Co., 155 Ohio St. 17,
97 N.E.2d 545 (1951) ; Purdy v. McGarity, 262 App. Div. 623, 30 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1941) ;
Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
The use of the loan receipt for this purpose, however, has been upheld elsewhere.
Glancy v. Ragsdale, 251 Iowa 793, 102 N.W.2d 890 (1960) ; Blair v. Espcland, 231 Minn.
444, 43 N.W.2d 274 (1950) ; see Atkinson, supra note 48, at 945; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d
42 (1967).
74 See Catalfano v. Higgins, 188 Aid 357 (Del. 1962); Alaska l'ac. S.S. Co. v.




recovery against the persons legally responsible for the insured's in-
juries." But a conflict of interest between the insured, the "trustee"
and the subrogated insurance company, "the beneficiary," does not
seem unlikely. The insurance company may have paid the insured its
maximum liability under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, say
$10,000, but the insured may claim he has an additional $10,000
worth of damage and therefore be unwilling to settle with the third
person, who may or may not be insured," for less than a total of
$20,000, while the "beneficiary" insurance company is willing to settle
with the third person for $10,000. Suppose the third person offers
$13,000 for a release from the trustee and the trustee turns it down,
not being willing to settle for $3,000 for himself from the third per-
son but wanting $10,000 for himself as well as $10,000 for the insur-
ance company. The claim is then tried and the litigation ends in a
judgment for the defendant. By what standards do we determine
whether the trustee's failure to settle amounted to a breach of duty
to the insurance company? The insured can hardly be expected to
accept any offer of settlement which the insurer wishes him to accept.
The insured has his own beneficial interest to protect. As trustee who
is part owner of the beneficial interest in the cause of action, the in-
sured would have a duty to give equal weight in the administration
of the trust to the interests of the insurer and to his own interests."
This is the same duty as that imposed by many courts on a casualty
liability insurer which assumes control of the defense of its insured
and there is a risk that a judgment will exceed the policy limits."
75 See notes 56 and 58 supra. The quoted policy provision requires the insured to
take appropriate action to recover the insurer's payment. The quoted trust agreement re-
quires the insured to take appropriate action to recover his damages. What is appropriate
for one purpose may not be appropriate for another. E.g., settlement with the defendant
for the amount paid by the insurance company. But any ambiguity or discrepancy as to
the duty of the insured would probably be construed against the insurance company,
which prepared both instruments. Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 III. App. 2d 132,
149, 174 N.E.2d 7, 15 (1961) ; In re Travelers Indem. Co., 26 Misc. 2d 513, 514, 205
N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Therefore the insured ought to be held only to
the duty to do what is appropriate to recover his damages.
76 An uninsured motorist and a driver of another car may be jointly liable for the
insured's injuries. The Uninsured Motorists Insurance carrier may have paid the insured
under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, as the contract requires it to do, since an
uninsured motorist is legally responsible, and may now be seeking to recover its loss from
the insured driver who was also legally responsible for the accident.
77 Title Guar. Trust Co. v. Sessinghaus, 325 Mo. 420, 429, 28 S.W.2d 1001, 1005
(1930) ; 2 A. Scott, Trusts § 183 (3d ed. 1967).
78 See Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 451, 46 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1932).
This duty is sometimes referred to as the duty of "good faith." Cf. Davy v. Public Nat'l
Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488, 492 (1960).
A casualty liability insurance company which assumes control of an insured's defense
is required, by some courts, to give more weight to the interests of its insured than to its
own interests. Tyger River Pin Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 292, 170 S.E.
346, 348 (1933). An insured under an Uninsured Motorists Endorsement who was in con-
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But there is an additional problem. Can the insured be expected to
recognize a reasonable offer of settlement when it is made to him? He
will ordinarily have no expertise in determining the value of claims.
In this respect he differs from the public liability insurance company
who assumes control of the defense of one of its insureds. Of course,
the insured could consult with an attorney who owed his undivided
loyalty to the insured." He probably would be protected if he relied
on the advice of such an attorney. 80 But he still would have the bur-
den of proving that he gave sufficient regard to the interests of the
insurance company, the beneficiary of his trust."
It is true that the insured could seek the advice of a court of
equity before rejecting any offered settlement." But this would put an
additional burden on the insured, and it is doubtful that equity courts
should be saddled with the task of giving such advice.
The fact remains that it is frequently difficult for a trustee who
owns a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust to give
equal regard to his interests and those of the other beneficial owners.
The courts are often reluctant to appoint an owner of a beneficial
interest in the trust as trustee and will sometimes require a trustee
who acquires a beneficial interest to resign." Even though this policy
of the courts is designed to protect the non-trustee beneficiaries, it also
seems unfair to the insured to thrust the insured into the position of
trustee. He should not be required to undertake the demanding office
of trustee, with its heavy burdens of watchful care and skill and ut-
trol of litigation might be held to the same duty, although it is unlikely that this would
be the case, when it is considered that the insurance company drafted the policy and the
trust agreement and imposed no such duty on the insured in the policy or trust agreement.
See Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 149, 174 N.E.2d 7, 15 (1961) ;
In re Travelers Indem. Co., 26 Misc. 2d 513, 514, 205 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
Some cases hold that when the insurance company assumes control of the defense
of the insured and there is a danger that an adverse judgment will be for an amount in
excess of the policy limits, the insurance company, if it has reserved the right to settle,
may give paramount consideration to its own interests in deciding whether or not to settle.
Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 162 Wis. 39, 52, 155 N.W. 1081, 1086 (1916) ;
Hilker v. Western Auto Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 14-15, 235 N.W. 413, 415 (1931).
79 See text at notes 94-97 infra.
R 9 Appeal of Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903); In re Clark's Will, 257 N.Y.
132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931).
87 See In re Martin's Trust Estate, 21 Wis. 2d 334, 124 N.W.2d 297 (1963); G. Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees § 970, at 203 (2d ed. 1965).
82 "If the trustee is in doubt whether he should compromise or submit to arbitration
a claim, he may ask the instruction of the court or he may agree thereto conditionally
upon the subsequent approval of the court." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 192,
comment d (1959).
82 2 A, Scott, Trusts § 183 (3d ed. 1967); cf. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. John-
son, 140 N.J. Eq. 548, 55 A.2d 813 (1947); Account of First Nat'l Bank, 382 Pa. 486,
115 A.2d 167 (1955).
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most, highly-scrutinized loyalty, in order to be paid a claim by an
insurance company.
B. The Problem Of Apportioning Attorneys' Fees And Other
Expenses Of Recovery From Third Parties
Uninsured Motorists Insurance policy provisions and trust agree-
ments sometimes state not only that the insurance company will be
entitled to be paid by the insured out of his recovery, the amount it
has paid him, but also "in the event of a recovery, the company shall
be reimbursed out of such recovery for expenses, costs and attorneys'
fees incurred in connection therewith. . . 2' 84 This provision means
that before the insured can keep any portion of the recovery from
a third party for himself, he must pay to the insurance company the
amount that it has paid him, plus attorneys' fees incurred for the
prosecution of the insurance company's portion of the claim, court
costs incurred by the insurance company, witness fees paid by the
insurance company, and possibly the insurance company's expenses
for investigation of the accident as well, at least insofar as the costs
of investigation relate to the liability of the third party. This provi-
sion seems contrary to the usual practice where subrogor and subrogee
share attorney's fees and expenses in a proportion, based on the ratio
that the amount of money paid by the insurance company to the in-
sured bears to total recovery from the tort-feasor. The provision
also may be inequitable because after the insurance company has par-
tially indemnified the claimant, the claim, at least in equity, belongs
to both the claimant and the insurance company, and fairness sug-
gests that the insurance company should pay the proportionate cost
of collecting the claim." In addition, if the insured has collected
$10,000 under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement and has incurred
an attorney's fee in connection with his representation on that claim
and then collects $20,000 from the tort-feasor, and must pay out of
his $10,000 share of the recovery the attorney's fee for the collection
of the $10,000 which goes to the insurance company, he will, in effect,
be paying a double attorney's fee for his collection of $10,000 under
the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement. If we view the trust agree-
ment as creating a trust, should one owner of an equitable interest,
the insured, have the total cost of the trustee's suit deducted from his
distribution rather than have expenses deducted equally from the dis-
84 See notes 56 and 58 supra.
85 See Brown v. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 105 F. Supp. 479, 482 (W.D. Pa. 1952) ;
Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammet, 237 Ark. 954, 956, 377 S.W.2d 811, 813
(1964); Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 132, 148-149, 174 N.E.2d 7,
15-16 (1961); General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 365-66, 52 N.E.2d
970, 973 (1944); Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., — R.I. —, 227 A.2d
105, 111 (1967) ; Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1965).
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tribution of each equitable owner of the cause of action? This pro-
vision, as written into the insurance policy and trust agreement, seems
contrary to the policy of some Workmen's Compensation Acts, which
provide that expenses of a recovery from a third party tort-feasor will
be deducted on a pro rata basis from the share of the claimant and from
the share of the employer or insurance carrier." It is true, of course,
that the claimant, if he is the policyholder, has agreed to the provision
in the policy entitling the insurance company to be reimbursed for
attorneys' fees and expenses out of any recovery. And even if he is not
the policy holder, he would ordinarily be bound by the provision as a
third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract." In either event, the
claimant would have executed a trust agreement containing such lan-
guage. But the provision in the trust agreement with regard to attor-
neys' fees and expenses could be set aside by a court exercising the
powers of equity on the ground that it is inequitable," especially since
the insured lacked independent legal advice when he executed the trust
agreement." The provision in the insurance policy is less susceptible
to modification by a court, since the contract, unlike the trust agree-
ment, has standing at law as well as in equity, but insofar as the con-
tract is one to create a trust, and the contract and the performance of
the contract are effective to create a trust, the trust ought to be admin-
istered by a court of equity according to equitable principles. Also, it
might be argued that the provision that the claimant shall reimburse
the insurance company for attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred
by it refers only to attorneys' fees and other expenses attributable to
the insured's share of the recovery." Whether or not courts will en-
force such a provision regarding attorneys' fees, legislatures may want
86 See statutes cited in note 123 infra.
S7 S. Williston, supra note 57.
88 "The sum in equity and good conscience due to the plaintiff [the insurance com-
pany] may well be less than that amount [the amount the insurance company paid to
the insured under the policy] because of necessary and reasonable expenses and perhaps
also attorney's fees, all of which it may be proper to allocate in just proportion [between
the insured's and the insurer's interests in the recovery from the tort-feasor] ...." Gen-
eral Exch. Ins. Co. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 366, 52 N.E.2d 970, 973 (1944). See
authorities cited in note 85 supra.
An inequitable or illegal provision in the trust may be struck down without causing
the entire trust to fail if failure to enforce the inequitable provision will not defeat the
purposes for which the trust was created. 1 A. Scott, Trusts § 60, 65.1-65.3 (3d ed.
1967).
811 Insurance adjusters are instructed to try to settle claims before the claimant sees
an attorney. There is reason to believe that the practice under Uninsured Motorists Insur-
ance is no different.
00 As a contract with standardized provisions which the offeror, the insurance com-
pany, is not willing to vary, but offers on a "take it or leave it" basis, the contract is
one of adhesion and any ambiguities will be construed against the offeror. Neal v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1961); see Remsen v. Midway
Liquors, Inc., 30 III. App. 2d 132, 149, 174 N.E.2d 7, 15-16 (1961).
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to legislate with respect to attorney's fees," spelling out the rights of
the insurance company and the claimant in this regard, and in the ab-
sence of such legislation insurance commissioners might wish to dis-
approve the provision discussed."'
C. Ethical Problems For Attorneys Prosecuting The Insured's
Action Against Third Persons
The Uninsured Motorists Endorsement and the trust agreement
both provide that, if the insurer so requests, the insured will pursue
the uninsured motorist or any other person who may be legally re-
sponsible for the accident, through an attorney designated by the in-
surance company. Ordinarily the insurer will not exercise this right,
but will allow the action against the third party to be prosecuted by
the insured's own attorney, if such attorney agrees to protect the in-
surer's interest. But this provision on the face of it would allow
the insurer to choose an attorney, who will prosecute the action on be-
half of the insured and the insurer, protecting both their interests. In
some cases the insurer will wish to do this, if its interest, acquired by
virtue of its payment of a claim under the Uninsured Motorists En-
dorsement, is substantial enough. Also, if the insured has no interest
in pursuing a claim against a third person, the insurer will often retain
its own attorney to do so. Even here, any recovery above what the in-
surer is entitled to by virtue of the policy and trust agreement will re-
dound to the benefit of the insured, so the insured retains an interest.
The same attorney, then, whether chosen by the insurer or insured of-
ten represents the interests of both parties.
If an attorney sues a third party while representing the interests
of both the insured and the insurer, the attorney should make clear to
both the insured and the insurer that he may have a divided loyalty."
91 The Virginia statute governing Uninsured Motorists Insurance expressly provides
that the insurance company shall have deducted from the amount paid to it as subrogee,
its proportionate share of the reasonable costs and expenses of recovery, including at-
torneys' fees. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(f) (Supp. 1966).
a2 Some statutes expressly authorize the insurance superintendent or another official
to issue regulations governing provisions to be inserted in Uninsured Motorists Endorse-
ments. Conn. Pub. Acts, No. 510, § 4 (1967) ; N.Y. Ins. Law § 167 (2-a) (McKinney
1966). A New Jersey statute allows the Insurance Commissioner to "order the discontinu-
ance of any provision in a policy of automobile liability insurance providing for . . .
disability or death benefits which he finds to be unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading or
contrary to law." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17:28-1 (1963). The context in which this language
appears makes it seem that such power exists only as to policies which contain a medical
payments endorsement, but one court has stated that such power exists with respect to
any insurance contract. Smith v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148
A.2d 37 (Ch.), aff'd, 56 N.J. Super. 203, 152 A.2d 369 (App. Div. 1959).
93 "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon,
a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to con-
tend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose." ABA Canons of Prd-
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If the third party makes an offer of settlement for, say, the amount
the insurer paid under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, the at-
torney's duty to the insured may. require him to advise the insured not
to accept the offer, if he thinks the insured is justified, in the light of
his fiduciary duty to the insurer, in seeking a higher payment. Yet the
attorney's loyalty to the insurer may incline him to advise acceptance
of the offer.
Consider also this case. There has been a three-car accident in
which the insured-trustee (T) was riding in car #1, driven by a named
insured, (NI), who carries liability insurance as well as Uninsured
Motorists Insurance, both with X Company. Car #2 is driven by an
uninsured motorist, (UM). Car #3 is driven by an insured motorist
(IM), who carries casualty liability insurance with Y Company. As-
sume UM is clearly at fault for the accident and IM is possibly at
fault and NI is also possibly at fault. T is seriously hurt and IM is
slightly hurt. X Company, the beneficiary of the trust agreement,
which also insures NI's liability against IM, may prefer that the trus-
tee not sue IM, because such a suit might arouse IM to sue NI. Yet
it would clearly be in the interest of the trustee (T) to sue IM.
Likewise, suppose the trustee wished to sue his own driver, NI.
Under most policies and trust agreements, this cause of action would
not be declared to be held in trust, so the attorney acting for the in-
sured, (T), would not be acting for the insurer, X Company. And
even if, as is the case with the trust agreement of at least one major
insurer, the cause of action against NI were declared to be held in
trust, X Company would not be the beneficial owner of it, at least
to the extent that the liability of NI was covered under X Company's
policy, because otherwise, to that extent, the insurer would be, in
effect, the beneficial owner of a cause of action against itself. Yet,
even though the attorney, in suing NI, would not be acting for any-
one but T, such attorney might be acting for both the insured and
the insurer, X Company, in a related action against UM, and would
still have a divided loyalty. It would be in T's interest that the at-
torney attempt to fasten liability on either UM or NI, but it would
be in the insurer's, X Company's, interest that liability be fastened
only on UM."
fessional Ethics, No. 6. See Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d 885
(1952) ; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482 (1958) ; Van Dyke v.
White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d 430 (1960) ; Covington, Problems of Professional
Responsibility, 14-21 (Council on Education in Professional Responsibility, ABA, 1966).
94 X Company's Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, under which the insured-trustee
originally recovered payment from X Insurance Company, would ordinarily provide that
X Company's third party liability exposure, as insurer of NI would be reduced by the
amount recovered by the insured-trustee under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement. But
such a provision, though it protected X Company, would not necessarily protect its insured,
NI, from the casualty liability exposure. And even if NI were protected to the same extent
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Furthermore, in the case mentioned immediately above, the at-
torney for T and X Company, if he were suing NI as well as UM or
IM, might not wish to reveal to X Company, except through the intro-
duction of evidence at the trial or to the extent required by the rules
of discovery, any evidence as to the injuries of his client T, which
was not presented to X Company in connection with the claim under
the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement. There can be good reason for
this strategy. X Company not only has a beneficial interest in T's
cause of action against UM and IM, but X Company is also the in-
surer of NI's common-law liability and T is suing NI in a common-
law action.
An attorney selected by either the insured or the insurer to repre-
sent both should recognize potential conflicts of interest" and suggest
that the parties retain separate attorneys. The courts also should
recognize them and interpret the policy and trust agreement to allow
separate representation of the insured and insurer if the parties so
wish." If the insured and insurer wish to have the same attorney,
after being apprised of the potential conflicts, then the same attorney
would be allowed to represent both parties, but he should not solicit
such dual employment.' And if he does agree to represent both parties
and a potential conflict becomes an actual one, he should review the
situation with his clients and give them a chance to retain separate
attorneys.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF A TRUST OF THE INSURED'S
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. A Trust O/ Rights Against Third Parties Acquired By Judg-
ment Or By Settlement Contract
The usual policy provides that the claimant, upon receiving
payment under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, will not only
declare a trust of his cause of action, but will promise to pursue the
tort-feasor and to hold the proceeds of any judgment against, or set-
X Company is, NI's common-law liability to T, the trustee, might be greater than the
amount T collected from X Company under the Uninsured Motorists Endorsement, mak-
ing it still advantageous for T to sue NI.
95 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 6, supra note 93.
96 Of course if the insured and the insurer were to be represented by separate at-
torneys, then the defendant might well raise defenses based on the assignment of a cause
of action for bodily injury. See text at notes 17 and 28 supra. The defendant might also
complain of the splitting of a cause of action. See text at note 42 supra. Even though he
will be sued only once, by the trustee, he may be subject to double cross-examination, by
the attorney for the insured and the attorney for the insurer. Also, the defendant may
invoke a mandatory real party in interest rule. See text at note 54 supra. If an insurance
company is represented by an attorney separately protecting its own interest, it is ac-
knowledging an interest in the cause of action separate from the trustee's interest. See
text at note 73 supra.
97 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 282 (1967).
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tlement with, the tort-feasor in trust." The trust agreement purports
to carry out these provisions." The promise to hold the proceeds of
any judgment or settlement in trust, separate from a declaration of
trust of an existing cause of action, does not create a trust of the pro-
ceeds when the promise is made. It does not even give rise to a con-
structive trust, on the theory that "equity regards as done what ought
to be done." This is because there cannot be a trust of a nonexistent
entity, an interest which has not yet come into existence,'" and there
can be no proceeds of a settlement or judgment before there is a set-
tlement or judgment. But a trust will arise once the settlement or
judgment money is paid to the claimant,'" on the theory that, since
the promisee-insurance company is entitled to specific performance of
the promise to declare a trust of the proceeds,'° 2 the promisee has an
equitable interest in the proceeds, even before a trust is declared!"
This device would protect the insurer from an attachment of property
paid to the trustee in liquidation of the settlement or judgment debt"'
or from the bankruptcy of the insured"' before the insured had paid
over to the insurer its share of the proceeds. Even during the interval
between the time of liquidation of the debt by judgment or settlement
contract and the time of payment for the judgment or settlement debt
to the claimant, the insurer would, in some states, have an equitable
lien on the judgment or settlement debt 106 and thus be protected
against garnishment of the debt"' or the bankruptcy of the insured.'"
The insurer does not need any additional protection against attach-
98 See policy provisions in note 56 supra.
99 See trust agreement provisions in note 58 supra.
100 Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1937); Restatement (Second)
of Trusts § 75 (1959); G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 113 (2d ed. 1965). It is true
that rights of the third party donee beneficiary of a life insurance contract which will
mature on the death of a living person can be held in trust, but there the liability of
the insurance company to pay a beneficiary of the policy is not so inchoate or so
uncertain as the liability of a third party tort-feasor, whose duty to pay is subject
to a finding of negligence or legal wrong.
101 Krellberg v. Gregory, 23 Misc. 2d 871, 199 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1960), rev'd
on other grounds, 10 App. Div. 2d 824, 199 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1960).
102 See Austin v. Young, 90 N.J. Eq. 47, 106 A. 395 (Ch. 1919); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 30, comment b (1959).
793 G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 113 (2d ed. 1965).
104 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 308 (1959).
798 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (c) (3) (Supp. 1967).
106 See Charles Kellas & Co. v. Slack & Slack Co., 129 Md. 535, 99 A. 677 (1916);
Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882); Reddy v. Zurich Gen. Ins. Co., 171 Misc.
69, 11 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
107 Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882). Some courts do not give effect to a
promise to assign the proceeds of a cause of action for bodily injury as against a creditor of
the promisor who garnishes the judgment debt, if the promise is made before settlement or
judgment. Harvey v. Cleman, 65 Wash. 2d 853, 858, 400 P.2d 87, 90 (1965) ; cf. Goldfarb
v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413, 171 A. 149 (Ch.), aff'd, 113 N.J.L. 399, 174 A. 507 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1934).
108 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 110 (0(3) (Supp. 1967).
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ment or garnishment of the insured's claim against the uninsured
motorist, or against bankruptcy of the claimant, before the insured's
claim is settled or reduced to judgment. The reason is that, as a rule,
claims for personal injury cannot be garnished or attached,'" or
reached by creditor's bill" before they are reduced to settlement or
judgment. And if they cannot be garnished or attached, they cannot
be reached by a trustee in bankruptcy.'"
A sole reliance on the promise to hold the proceeds in trust might
also seem to protect the insurance company from the defense that a
cause of action for personal injury is being assigned. Courts have some-
times drawn a distinction between the assignment of a cause of action
and an assignment of the proceeds, for the purposes of allowing the
assignee to proceed against the defendant after judgment' and of
protecting the assignee against garnishment of the settlement debt.'
If there were only to be a trust of the proceeds, the cause of
action would not be split and the defendant would not be subject to
double harrassment. Also, whether or not the insurance contract were
one of indemnity should make no difference. It would be no concern
of the judgment debtor what the insured does with the proceeds. Even
if garnishing creditors could object to a promise to declare a trust
of the proceeds, the judgment debtor ought not be able to do so
successfully.
The trust of the proceeds device might also protect the insurer
from being identified in any suit against a third party. Since the
claimant would retain the amount of any proceeds above the insur-
ance company's share, the claimant would remain a real party in
interest. Under a permissive real party in interest statute, the claimant
could not be prevented by the defendant from proceeding alone.'"
Even under a mandatory real party in interest .statute, since the in-
surance company would have no interest in the action but only in
mu Garnishment and attachment statutes ordinarily allow only "debts" or "credits"
to be garnished. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-329 (Supp. 1968); Fla. Stat. § 77.01
(Supp. 1968); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 62, § 33 (1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 246, § 20
(1959); Nis. Stat. Ann. § 267.01 (Supp. 1968). Unliquidated tort claims are not "debts" or
"credits." Holcomb v. Winchester, 52 Conn. 447, 448 (1885) ; see White Sewing Mach. Co.
v. Morrison, 232 Mass. 387, 388, 122 N.E. 291 (1919); Lehmann v. Farwell, 95 Wis. 185,
190, 70 N.W. 170, 171 (1897).
114 White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Morrison, 232 Mass. 387, 388, 122 N.E. 291 (1919).
111 A trustee in bankruptcy's rights to the bankrupt's property would not extend
beyond the rights of a hypothetical creditor with a judicial lien. 11 U.S.C.A. § 110(c)
(Supp. 1967).
112 See cases cited at notes 106 and 107 supra.
113 Grossman v. Schlosser, 19 App. Div. 2d 893, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
The court in this case made the distinction, reluctantly, observing that this was the indirect
assignment of a cause of action, but feeling bound by the New York cases which protected
an assignee of the proceeds against a creditor garnishing the judgment.
114 See Gould v. Weibel, 62 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1952).
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the recovery, it has been held that the insurance company would not
be a necessary party.'"
The use of a trust of the proceeds would also be of advantage
to the claimant, because if he were not to be trustee of the cause of
, action, but only of the proceeds, he probably would not have a trus-
tee's burden of proving that he acted properly in refusing to settle
a claim. And his duty to accept an offered settlement would probably
not require any more than an equal regard for his interests and those
of the insurance company."°
If the insurance company claimed only a trust of the proceeds, it
is doubtful that it could force prosecution of the cause of action. This
would depend on the intent of the parties to the insurance contract
and trust agreement. If, however, the insurance company could force
prosecution of the cause of action, it would appear to have an equitable
interest in the cause of action. The problems of assignment and real
party in interest which exist under a trust of the cause of action would
arise again Likewise, if the insurer claimed it was entitled to separate
legal representation, it would be claiming more than an interest in the
proceeds, and the spectres of assignment, splitting, indemnity and
real party in interest would appear.
B. Handling The Problems By Statute: The Workmen's
Compensation Acts as Models
In some ways Uninsured Motorists Insurance is similar to the
protection provided under Workmen's Compensation Acts. Work-
men's Compensation Acts and statutes requiring that Uninsured
Motorists Coverage be offered to buyers of automobile liability insur-
ance both represent a judgment by a state legislature that persons
should be reimbursed, or at least have a chance to purchase insurance
providing reimbursement, for a loss caused by a person who is legally
responsible for the loss, but who is unlikely to have the assets to
made good the loss. Workmen's Compensation Acts also provide, of
course, for reimbursement of workers who suffer loss for which no
one is legally responsible at common law. In the Workmen's Compen-
sation situation, as well as in the Uninsured Motorists Insurance con-
text, there might arise questions about the employer's or insurer's
right to subrogation to a cause of action for personal injury, about
the right of the employer or insurer to keep its interest undisclosed
to the trier of fact, about whether the decision as to settlement with
115 Leonard v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 417, 245 N.W. 849, 851 (1933); see Liner
v. Mittelstadt, 257 Wis. 70, 80, 42 N.W.2d 504, 509 (1950). But see Md. Ann. Code Rule
243 (1963).
116 See Cassetta v. Del Frate, 116 Cal. App. 255, 2 P.2d 533 (1931); Richard v.
National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 330, 285 N.Y.S. 870, 877 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. City
1936); Glegg v. Bromley, I1912] All E.R. 1138, [19121 3 K.B. 474, 484.
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the third-party tort-feasor should be controlled by the injured victim
or the employer or insurer, and about the apportionment of a recovery
from the tort-feasor between the victim and the employer or insurer.
These questions, when they arise in the Workmen's Compensation
context, are frequently answered by statute.
Employers or insurers who pay Workmen's Compensation claims
do not have to rely on "trust agreements" in order to share in the
workman's recovery from the tort-feasor. Legislation in almost every
state provides for participation by the employer or insurer in recov-
eries from third parties.'" Laws in many states allow the employer
or insurer itself to sue - the tort-feasor. 1 i 8 Nor do employers or Work-
men's Compensation insurers necessarily have to pose as beneficiaries
of trusts in order to hide their identity from juries. Many states allow
the employer or insurer to institute a suit in the name of the insured.""
When the suit is instituted by the insured, the employer or insurer
ordinarily is entitled to remain unidentified 1 20 Similar clarity in the
Uninsured Motorists Insurance area seems preferable to the present
117 E.g., Arizona, a cause of action for personal injury is not assignable. Employers
Cas. Co. v. Moore, 60 Ariz. 544, 142 P.2d 414 (1943). But if compensation is elected,
the claims against the third party shall be assigned to the state or to the person liable to pay
compensation. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1023 B (1956). California, a cause of action for
personal injury is not assignable. Cal. Prob. Code § 573 (West Supp. 1967). But the em-
ployer may sue a third party tort-feasor. Cal. Labor Code § 3852 (West 1955). Mas-
sachusetts, causes of action for personal injury are not assignable. The Bethlehem Fabri-
cators v. H.D. Watts Co., 286 Mass. 556, 190 N.E. 828 (1934). But if compensation is
elected the insurer may bring suit against the third party tort-feasor. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 152, § 15 (1965). In New Jersey causes of action for personal injury are not assignable.
Goldfarb v. Reicher, 112 N.J.L. 413, 171 A. 149 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 113 N.J.L. 399, 174 A.
507 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934). But if compensation is elected and the employee does not
sue the third party, the employer may. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-40(f) (1959). In all but
three states, Ohio, New Hampshire and West Virginia, the employer or insurer is entitled
to share in the recovery. 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 74.11 (1961).
119 Many states allow the injured employee the first chance to sue the third party
even though the employee has claimed compensation, but provide that the employer or
insurance company liable to pay compensation may sue if the employee does not within
a period provided by statute, the period running from the date of the accident to a cutoff
date regulated by the statute of limitations on the common law action against the third
party. See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 26, § 312 (Supp. 1967); Fla. Stat. § 440.39(4)(a) ( 1 966 );
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5(6) (1965); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.189 (1960) ; N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 34:15-40(f) (1959); N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(2) (McKinney 1965).
Other statutes provide that the employer or his insurance company has the exclusive
right to sue the third party, but if he does not, the employee may. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 152, § 15 (1965). Other states allow both the employer and employee to sue.
E.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.29(1) (1957).
119 E.g., Ma. Code tit. 26, § 312 (Supp. 1967) ; Fla. Stat. § 440.39(4) (a) (1966) ;
III. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5(6) (1965); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, § 15 (1965);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.189 (1960) ; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-40(f) (1959).
129 Davison v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., 169 Kan. 256, 218 P.2d 219 (1950); West
v. Molders Foundry Co., 342 Mass. 8, 171 N.E.2d 860 (1961) ; Jones v. Otis Elevator Co.,
231 N.C. 285, 56 S.E.2d 684 (1949). But see United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338
U.S. 366, 382 (1949).
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uncertainties which have spawned the "trust of the cause of action"
device.
Questions which arise when the insurance company wants to set-
tle and the insured does not could be handled by legislation, which
could provide that each claimant may settle independently of the
other, as some states provide in their Workmen's Compensation
Acts.'" Or it could be provided that any dispute between the insured
and the insurer would be settled by the court before which the claim
against the third party is pending, or settled by a court of record if no
suit is pending. 122
With respect to the sharing of the attorney's fees and expenses,
the Workmen's Compensation Acts of several states require the em-
ployer or his insurance company to count a pro rata share of the costs
of recovery from a third-party tort-feasor toward the employer's reim-
bursement for the compensation which he has paid, or is liable for,
and thus provide that the employer or insurer absorb part of the
costs of recovery, even when there is enough money available to pay
expenses and reimburse the employer in full. 123 It is true that some
states provide in their Workmen's Compensation Acts that the em-
ployee will receive nothing out of any recovery from the third-party
tort-feasor until the employer has been fully reimbursed for the com-
pensation he has paid, or remains liable for, and these states thus
require the employee's share, if any, of the recovery, to bear the ex-
pense of recovery. 124 States which do require the employer or insurer
to absorb part of the cost of recovery from a third party, may wish
to make the same provision with respect to recoveries from uninsured
motorists when part of the recovery is to go to the Uninsured Motor-
ists Insurance carrier, and thus negate the effect of the provisions in
121 Cf. Del. Code Ann, tit. 19, § 2363(b) (Supp. 1966) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.189
(1960).
122 Wisconsin has a similar provision as part of its Workmen's Compensation Act.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.29 (1957).
123 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2363(f) (Supp. 1966) ; Fla. Stat. § 440.39(3)(a),
(4)(a) (1966); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, § 15 (1965); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 77, § 671
(Supp. 1967).
In Wisconsin, if the amount of the recovery exceeds the expenses of suit, the employee
gets one-third of the balance, and then the employer or insurer is reimbursed out of what
is left. This in effect causes the employer or insurer to absorb the expenses of recovery if
there is not enough left, after payment of expenses and the employee's one-third, to-reim-
burse the employer or insurance company in full. But if the excess after giving the em-
ployee one-third is sufficient to fully reimburse the employer or insurance company, the
balance will be paid to the employee and thus he will effectively absorb the expense of
recovery. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.29 (1957).
124 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 26, § 312 (Supp. 1967); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1023
C (1956) ; Cal. Labor Code § 3956(a), (b) (West 1966); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-392
(1962); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 138.5(6) (1965); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.189 (1960) ;




the insurance contract and the trust agreement which provide that
the costs of making claims are to be deducted from the claimant's
share, if any, of the recovery.
Those states which provide in their Workmen's Compensation
Acts that the net recovery from the third party is not merely to go to
the employer or insurance company to the extent of their liability,
with the balance to the employee, but is to be divided according to
some other formula,' may wish to make a similar provision with
respect to recoveries from uninsured motorists.
V. CONCLUSION
The answers to the questions raised by the desire of insurance
companies to be subrogated to the claims of their insureds under
Uninsured Motorists Insurance should proceed from a direct confronta-
tion of these problems by courts, legislators and insurance commis-
sioners. There are values to be chosen as part of the process of an-
swering the questions posed. And these choices ought to be consciously
made and not swept under the rug of a "trust agreement" drafted
by the insurance companies and offered to the public on a "take it
or leave it" basis. Insurance commissioners should be alert for such
problems when exercising whatever powers they have to control the
contents of insurance policies. And there should be development in the
legislative approach to this area, similar to that which has been made
in the Workmen's Compensation area.
It is true that if these issues were to be solved by legislation or
administrative regulation there would be differences in legislation
among the various states, and that policy filings and endorsements
would differ among states, thus increasing the cost of administration
of Uninsured Motorists Insurance and possibly increasing the cost of
such insurance to the purchaser. But the same administrative prob-
lems for insurance companies arise under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Acts. If regulation of Uninsured Motorists Insurance is found to
be desirable, the burden ought to be on the insurance companies to
show that increased administrative costs would substantially affect the
premiums. Then the legislature could weigh the disadvantage of an
increased premium against the advantages to be gained from remedy-
ing the uncertainties, and the occasional unfairness, in the present
arrangement.
125 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 152, § 15 (1965). (If the insurer brings the action, the
employee gets only four-fifths of the recovery in excess of the amount of the compensation
for which the insurer is liable.) N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(2) (McKinney
1965). (If the employer sues, the employee gets only two-thirds of the recovery in excess
of the employer's liability under the Act.) Wis. Stat. Ann. § 102.29 (1957). (The employee
gets one-third of any recovery above the expenses of making claim, even though this
result means the employer or insurer will not he fully reimbursed.)
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Insurance companies will also gain something from such a com-
prehensive approach to the problem. While much of what they seek
through the use of the trust agreement should be theirs without the
use of that artificial device, administrative and legislative regulation
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